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Comments
CRIIAL LAW-ABORTION-THE NED FoR LEGISATIVE REFOB.-
To understand the controversy surrounding Kentucky's statute regu-
lating abortion, one must first understand the statute's history. Until
1910, abortion was not considered a crime in the Commonwealth of
Kentucky. In Mitchell v. Commonwealth' the Kentucky Court of Ap-
peals held that at common law abortion was not a punishable of-
fense.
, .. [W]e are forced to the conclusion that it never was a punishable
offense at common law to produce, with the consent of the mother, an
abortion prior to the time when the mother became quick with child.
It was not even murder at common law to take the life of the child at
any period of gestation, even in the very act of delivery.2
The Court gives abortion a more detailed discussion in Peoples v.
Commonwealth::
* . . conceding it to be the common-law rule that one is not indictable
for the commission of an abortion unl-ss the child has quickened. Yet, all
the authorities agree that, if from the means used the death of the
woman results, it is either murder or manslaughter.4
A similar position was taken by the Court of Appeals in other
cases.5 Yet, despite the Court's holding that abortion was not a crime
at common law, the Court's sentiments against abortion are clearly
evident.
In the interest of good morals and for the preservation of society,
the law should punish abortions and miscarriages wilfully produced, at
any time during the period of gestation . . . [the common law con-
ception of abortion] presents an anomaly of the law that ought to be
provided against by the law-making department of the government. The
limit of our duty is to determine what the law is, and not to enact or
declare it as it should be.. 6
It took more than thirty years for the "law-making department"
to respond to the Court's plea. On January 13, 1910, Dr. R. H. Moss
3178 Ky. 204 (1879).
2 Id. at 210. The Court never reaches a precise definition as to the meaning
of "quick with child." Yet, the court cites several definitions, all of which seem
to indicate that quickening refers to "the first physical proof of life."3 87 Ky. 487, 9 S.W. 509 (1888).
4 Id. at 493, 9 S.W. at 512.5 Wilson v. Commonwealth, 22 Ky. L. Reptr. 1251, 60 S.W. 400 (1901);
Clark v. Commonwealth, 111 Ky. 443, 63 S.W. 740 (1901).6 Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 204, 209-10 (1879).
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introduced a bill in Kentucky's House of Representatives which
defined abortion and made it a crime.7 A few days later Dr. B. F.
Tichenor introduced a similar bill in the Senate.8 The General As-
sembly eventually adopted Dr. Moss' bill, and on March 22, 1910, the
commission of an abortion, except to save the life of the mother, be-
came a crime in Kentucky. The original statute read as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person to prescribe or administer to any
pregnant woman, or to any woman whom he has reason to believe
pregnant, at any time during the period of gestation, any drug, medicine
or substance, whatsoever, with the intent thereby to procure the mis-
carriage of such woman, or with like intent, to use any instrument or
means whatsoever unless such miscarriage is necessary to preserve her
life. . . .9
With only slight modifications, Section I of the Kentucky's original
abortion statute has been preserved in the Kentucky Revised Statutes
§ 486.020.l There has been very little litigation involving Kentucky's
abortion statute. It has been held that any one who aids a woman in
obtaining an abortion is punishable under the statute,11 that actual
pregnancy is not necessary so long as the accused has reason to believe
the woman is pregnant,12 and that when a doctor testifies that an
abortion was necessary to save the life of the mother, the burden of
proving otherwise rests on the state.'3
The next step in understanding the abortion controversy is to
compare Kentucky's statute with those of other jurisdictions and with
those proposed by various medical and legal groups. Abortion statutes
may be divided into three basic catagories-prohibitive, qualified pro-
hibitive, and therapeutic. The "prohibitive" abortion statute is one
which allows no abortion whatsoever-Louisiana has a statute of this
type.
Abortion is the performance of any of the following acts, for the
purpose of procuring premature delivery of the embryo or fetus:
7 H.R. JouR. 104 (1910).
8 S. Jotm. 216 (1910).
9 Ch. 58, § 1, [1910] Ky. Acts 189.10 KRS § 436.020 (1962) provides as follows:
(1) Any person who prescribes or administers to any pregnant woman
or to any woman whom he has reason to believe pregnant, at any time
during the period of gestation, any drug, medicine or other substance,
or uses any instrument or other means, with the intent to procure the
miscarriage of that woman, unless the miscarriage is necessary to preserve
her life, shall be fined not less than five hundred dollars nor more than
one thousand dollars, and confined in the penitentiary for not less than
one nor more than ten years.
11 Richmond v. Commonwealth, 370 S.W.2d 399 (Ky. 1964).12 Dotye v. Commonwealth, 289 S.W.2d 206 (Ky. 1956).
13FitQh v. Cormmonwealth, 291 Ky. 748, 165 S.W.2d 558 (1942).
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(1) Administrtion of any drug, potion, or any other substance to a
pregnant female; or
(2) Use of any instrument or any other means whatsoever on a
pregnant female.
Whoever commits the crime of abortion shall be imprisoned .... 14
The "qualified prohibitive" abortion statute is one which forbids
abortion but does allow an exception when necessary to save the
mother's life. Kentucky's present statute is representative of this
group.
The "therapeutic" abortion statute is a very recent legislative ap-
proach to the problem of abortion.15 While making the performance of
an abortion a crime, these statutes do allow exceptions in certain cir-
cumstances. The number of exceptions vary from state to state. In
California the exceptions are limited to cases where " [ t]here is sub-
stantial risk that continuance of the pregnancy would gravely impair
the physical or mental health of the mother" and where "[t]he
pregnancy resulted from rape or incest."10 On the other hand, North
Carolina's statute is somewhat broader, allowing an abortion where
"[t] here is substantial risk that continuancy of the pregnancy would
threaten the life or gravely impair the health of said woman," where
"[t]here is substantial risk that the child would be born with grave
physical or mental defect," and where "[t] he pregnancy resulted from
rape or incest."2 Colorado's statute is very similar to that of North
Carolina with the exception that it is more explicit in specifying that
an abortion may take place if continuation of the pregnancy is likely
to result in the "serious permanent impairment of the physical health
of the woman" or "serious permanent impairment of mental health of
the woman."'8
At first glance, it might seem that these "therapeutic" abortion
statutes are extremely liberal, but closer examination reveals that they
contain numerous restraints which are intended to prevent abuse.
First, all the statutes require some formal process of authorizing the
abortion-certification by a committee of the medical staff of the
hospital where the abortion is to be performed 19 or certification by
1 4 
LA, REV. STAT. § 14.87 (1950).
15At the time this comment was written the only states known to have
"therapeutic" abortion statutes were California, Colorado, Georgia, Maryland, and
North Carolina. For purposes of this discussion, only the California, Colorado, and
North Carolina statutes will be examined since they are representative of the
total group.
10 CA.. HEALTH & SAFY CODE § 25951 (c)(1)(2) (West 1967).
17 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1 (Supp. 1967).
ISCOLO. Rlv. STAT. § 40-2-50(4) (a) (i)(ii) (1967).
19 CAL, HzALTH & SAfzTY CODE § 25951(b) (West 1967).
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three doctors not engaged jointly in private practice 0 or certification
by all the members of a special hospital board.2 1 Also, each state re-
quires that the abortion be performed in a licensed hospital.22
A second form of restraint provided by these statutes concerns
itself with aborting a pregnancy resulting from rape or incest. In
California, the hospital committee must notify the district attorney of
the county in which the alleged rape or incest occurred and only after
he informs the committee that there is probable cause that the alleged
rape or incest occurred may the committee approve the abortion. If
the district attorney fails to find probable cause, the committee may
petition the superior court of the county in which the alleged rape
occured. If the court finds that it has been proved by a preponderance
of the evidence that the pregnancy did occur as a result of the alleged
rape or incest, the committee may approve the abortion.23 In North
Carolina, only rapes reported to the authorities within seven days
after the alleged rape occurred qualify for an abortion under the
statute.24 In Colorado, the district attorney of the judicial district in
which the alleged rape occurred must inform the committee that
there is probable cause that the alleged rape occurred in order for the
pregnancy to qualify under the statute. Also, the Colorado statute
requires that, in the case of rape, no more than sixteen weeks of
gestation shall have passed.25
In addition to these general restraints, there may be certain other
specific requirements which must be adhered to in the various states.
In Colorado, a "doctor of medicine specializing in psychiatry" must
certify that there will be "permanent impairment of the mental health
of the woman."26 In North Carolina, there is a four month residency
requirement unless the abortion is necessary to save the life of the
mother.27
It is interesting to note how closely these enacted statutes conform
to the proposals of the American Law Institute and the American
Medical Association. The Model Penal Code proposed by the American
Law Institute provides as follows:
(2) Justifiable Abortion. A licensed physician is justified in termi-
nating a pregnancy if he believes there is substantial risk that continuancy
20N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1 (Supp. 1967).2 1 COLO. REv. STAT. § 40-2-50(4)f(a) (1967).2 2 CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CoDE § 25951(a) (West 1967); CoLO. REv.
STAT. § 40-2-50(4)(a) (1967); N.C. GEN. STAT. H8 1445.1 (Supp. 1967).2 3 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25952(a)(b) (West 1967).
24 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-45.1 (Supp. 1967).
2 5 CoLo. REV. STAT. § 40-2-50(4) (a)(ii) (1967)
26 Id. § 40-2-50(4) (a) (i).27 N.C. GEN. STAT. H 14-45.1 (Supp. 1967).
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of the pregnancy would gravely impair the physical or mental health of
the mother or that the child would be born with grave physical or mental
defect, or the pregnancy resulted from rape, incest, or other felonious
intercourse. All illicit intercourse with a girl below the age of 16 shall
be deemed felonious for purposes of this subsection. Justifiable abortions
shall be performed only in a licensed hospital except in a case of
emergency when hospital facilities are unavailable.
(3) Physicians' Certificates; Presumption of Noncompliance. No
abortion shall be performed unless two physicians, one of whom may be
the person performing the abortion, shall have certified in writing the
circumstances which they believe to justify the abortion. Such certificate
shall be submitted before the abortion to the hospital where it is to be
performed, and, in the case of abortion following felonious intercourse,
to the prosecuting attorney or police .... 28
The American Medical Association is opposed to induced abortion except
when:
(1) There is documented medical evidence that continuance of the
pregnancy may threaten the health or life of the mother, or
(2) There is documented medical evidence that the infant may be born
with incapacitating physical deformity or mental deficiency, or
(3) There is documented medical evidence that continuancy of a
pregnancy, resulting from legally established statutory or forcible
rape or incest may constitute a threat to the mental or physical
health of the patient;
(4) Two other physicians chosen because of their recognized professional
competency have examined the patient and have concurred in
writing; and
(5) The procedure is performed in a hospital accredited by the joint
Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals.29
Thus, it is evident that recently enacted and proposed legislation
makes a broad departure from the "prohibitive" and "qualified pro-
hibited" statutes found in most jurisdictions. Yet, this departure is far
short of common law practices and still maintains tight regulation of
abortion.
The question remaining is why groups such as the American Medi-
cal Association and the American Law Institute as well as several
states are making such a departure from the traditional abortion
statutes in calling for or enacting "therapeutic" abortion statutes. The
answer may be that these groups and jurisdictions have come to view
abortion as a social problem which must be dealt with by appropriate
social legislation. The "prohibitive" and "qualified prohibitive" abor-
tion statutes are primarily concerned with protecting the interest of
live birth without regard to what effects that birth may have on the
mother or society as a whole. On the other hand, the "therapeutic"
abortion statute, while maintaining the basic protection of live birth,
28 MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
29 AUA Policy on Therapeutic Abortion, 201 J.A.M.A. 544 (1967).
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also considers the interest of the mother in protection from a harmful
pregnancy and the interest of the child in well birth so that it may
become a happy, normal, and productive member of society, not a
burden upon it. Some actual cases will illustrate this point.30
In September of 1968 the staff of the University Hospital at the
University of Kentucky was requested to perform a therapeutic
abortion on, and to sterilize, a twenty-one year old woman. The
woman was severely retarded-she had to be constantly cared for
and was mute as a result of her retardation. The woman's parents,
who had two other retarded children, requested the operations. The
parents had no idea as to how the girl became pregnant, when the
sexual relationship had occurred, or who was the father of the child.
The staff at the hospital surmised that the pregnancy was a result of
sexual molestation.
The woman's family history, together with the fact that a sister had
given birth to a retarded child, led the staff to conclude that chances
of the child being normal were "slim". The situation was further
complicated by the fact that continuation of the pregnancy might
have serious effects on the mental and physical health of the woman.
The parents of the woman also indicated that because of their family
situation, the child, if allowed to be born, would have to be insti-
tutionalized whether or not it was normal. In either case, the child
would be totally unadoptable.
Another recent request for a therapeutic abortion was made by a
twenty-one year old, unmarried junior in college. The girl bad
threatened to commit suicide to avoid giving birth to a child out of
wedlock. Psychiatric tests indicated that the girl had fallen into a
30 The following case histories were obtained on October 2, 1968, in an inter-
view with Dr. John W. Greene, Professor and Chairman of the Department of
Obstetrics and Gynecology, University of Kentucky Medical Center. It is virtu-
ally impossible to determine how many similar cases arise in Kentucky each year.
Perhaps the reader can obtain some insight into this area by examining related
statistics from Colorado. A recent article by Leland H. Rayson, a member of the
Illinois State Legiqlature, reported the following ctati'tics:
One year after the enactment of the Colorado law on abortion, the
Colorado Department of Public Health reported a total of 227 therapeutic
abortions. State residents accounted for 162 of them. In the vast majority
of cases, 123, psychiatric reasons were advanced for the operation. Other
reasons were included medical risk, 28; rape, 21; rubella, 13. Such figures
do not presuppose a gush of legal abortions resulting from the enact-
ment of therapeutic abortion legislation.
* * 0 0
It is estimated that from one in ten to one in four of all pregnancies
end in abortion. Overall the figure of illegally induced abortions in the
United States are estimated at about one million a year. Certainly, most
authorities would agree the figure is in excess of 500,000. Rayson, Abor-
tion Law Reform in Illinois?, SUENT LAWYER J., Dec. 1968, at 18.
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state of deep depression and that it was highly probable that she
might take her own life.
A third case involved the request for a therapeutic abortion made
by a woman who had already given birth to six mentally retarded
children and feared her seventh pregnancy would yield a similar off-
spring. The staff at the hospital fully agreed that such might be the
case.
In each of these cases the staff at the Hospital thought an abortion
should be performed, but in each case the abortion was refused be-
cause the operating doctor would be subject to a felonious prosecution
under Kentucky's abortion statute. Thus by statute, the Common-
wealth of Kentucky has dictated that: (1) a mentally retarded
woman who was probably impregnated by a felonious sexual assault
must bear the impact of that pregnancy on her physical and mental
health and that the unadoptable and probably retarded child pro-
duced by that assault will have to spend a part, if not all its life, in a
state institution; (2) that a college coed must bear the risk that an
out-of-wedlock pregnancy might have a serious effect on her mental
health or even drive her to commit suicide;3' and (3) that a mother of
six retarded children may have to give birth to a seventh who, along
with the other six, may eventually have to be institutionalized. Thus,
while protecting the fetus' interest of live birth, the Commonwealth
has totally disregarded the mother's interest in protection from a harm-
ful pregnancy and the fetus' interest in being born with adequate
faculties to become a productive member of society instead of a
burden upon it. Also, no consideration was given to the agony the child
might suffer as an institutionalized retardate. The following com-
ment by Dr. Allan C. Barnes3 2 gives additional dimension to the
above considerations:
Thus, a woman who is six weeks pregnant acquires a full blown case
of German measles. I am not interested in your personal views of the
statistical risk of that baby being damaged, because this is a gamble
where one is concerned not with the odds but with the stakes. Or let
us say she consumes a large quantity of thalidomide, where nobody
knows epidemiologically what the odds may be. Carrying the potentially
damaged child to term will not risk the life of the mother, and abortion
is therefore illegal.
Or let us say that at five or five and a half months one establishes
by X-ray that the fetus is an acranial monster. Again this pregnancy
must, according to the various state laws, proceed to term. I changed
31 In this case, the subject was able to go to another state and receive a legal
abortion.32 Professor and Chairman, Department of Gynecology and Obstetrics, the
Johns Hopkins University; Gynecologist-Obstetrician-in-Chief, the Johns Hopkins
Hospital.
1969]
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from a first trimester example to a second trimester example partially
to remind you that the child had in the interim gained a significant
legal protection. An abortion performed in the first trimester for a
fetal indication is a felony usually calling for about 17 years in prison;
after four and a half months, in most states, it would become man-
slaughter permitting 99 years in prison.
Until the laws of this country genuinely recognize the right to be
well born, we shall continue to waste reproductive time for the mother
and condemn the damaged child to hopeless institutional care.33
No matter how strong one's religious and moral beliefs may be
about therapeutic abortion, it should be recognized that this question
also involves very critical social issues. The time has come when we
must re-examine our stand against therapeutic abortion. How can a
nation which constantly proclaims itself to be dedicated to the al-
leviation of human suffering continue to allow the pain and suffering
that is arbitrarily thrust upon innocent persons by our antiquated
abortion statutes? Is it right to force a woman to carry a child to term
if the pregnancy will cause a total breakdown of her physical or
mental facilities? Is it right to allow a child to be born knowing that
he will be condemned to hopeless institutional care? Perhaps one can
go so far as to ask, is it right to allow a child to be born knowing that
he will be unwanted, unloved, and denied the proper social training
required to become a member of society?34 Other juisdictions have
faced these issues and now Kentucky should give them proper
consideration.
The Outline For Proposed Criminal Law Revision prepared by
the Kentucky Crime Commission fails to give the abortion question
adequate consideration. Although the Commission proposes that
Kentucky's abortion statute be examined,3 5 the Commission offers no
"commentary" on the subject.30 Also, the Commission's proposal of
"preferred" sources for the revision includes both Kentucky's present
statute and a very similar Illinois statute.37 In fact, the only "thera-
peutic" abortion statute mentioned in the report is a listing of the
Model Penal Code in the list of secondary sources.38
In view of the very important social issues raised by Kentucky's
abortion statute and similar statutes in other jurisdictions, the 1970
33 Address by Dr. Allan C. Barnes, Second International Conference on
Congenital Malformation, July 14-19, 1967.3 4 It would be interesting to know how many so-called unwanted children
either raised in a hostile home atmosphere or in state institutions eventually exhibit
social tendencies and are confined to penal institutions.
35 2 KENTUCKy CR ME ComisszoN, OuTLnqE FoR PROPOSED CIMINAL Lw
REVISION § 3220 (1968).
36 Id., Vol. 1.
37 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38. § 23-2 (1965).
38 2 KE~nrucKy CaRnvr COMvmissIoN, OUTLNE FOR PROPOSED LAw REVION
§ 3220 (1968).
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General Assembly ought to give this subject more attention than it
received from the Crime Commission.39 Even if the General Assembly
finds adoption of a "therapeutic" abortion statute absolutely unfeasible
in view of the political, religious, and social atmosphere of Kentucky, it
ought to give such reform proper consideration. At the very minimum,
a therapeutic abortion statute should be introduced and sensibly
debated. If the General Assembly were to raise these issues and
rationally discuss their underlying social significance without resort to
emotionalism, perhaps others would follow the lead and reshape their
own thinking. No matter what, the General Assembly should not
avoid the issue-there is too much at stake. The very heart of the
democratic process is the proposition that the government is formed to
serve the people. How better can a government serve its people than
by passage of legislation leading to the removal of human pain and
suffering?
Sidney M. Morris
39 During the 1968 Kentucky General Assembly there was a futile attempt to
enact the following "therapeutic" abortion statute:
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of
Kentucky:
A new section of the Kentucky Revised Statutes is created to read
as follows:
(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of KRS 436.020, it shall not be
unlawful to advise, procure, or cause the miscarriage of a pregnant
woman or an abortion when it is performed by a doctor of medicine
licensed to practice medicine in Kentucky, if he can reasonably establish
that:
(a) There is substantial risk that continuance of the pregnancy
would threaten the life or gravely impair the health of the woman, or
(b) There is substantial risk that the child would be born with grave
physical or mental defect, or
(c) The pregnancy resulted from forcible rape or incest and the
alleged forcible rape was reported to a law enforcement agency or court
official within seven days after the alleged forcible rape.
(2) The miscarriage may be caused, or the abortion performed:
(a) Only after the woman has given her written consent for the
abortion or miscarriage, and if the woman is a minor or is incompetent
as adjudicated by any court of competent jurisdiction then only after per-
mission is given in writing by the parents, or if married her husband,
guardian or person or persons standing in loco parentis to her, and
(b) Only if the abortion is performed in a hospital licensed under
the provisions of KRS 216.400 to 216.500, and
(c) Only after three doctors of medicine not engaged jointly in
private practice, one of whom shall be the person performing the abor-
tion, have examined the woman and certified in writing the circumstances
which they believe to justify the abortion, and
(d) Only when the certificate has been submitted before the abor-
tion to the hospital where it is to be performed; provided, however, that
where an emergency exists, and the certificate so states, the certificate
may be submitted within twenty-four hours after the abortion. H.B. 120
1968.
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